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NOTES
DISCOVERY: WORK PRODUCT AND GOOD CAUSE DEVELOP-
MENT SINCE "HICKMAN V. TAYLOR"
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a great
amount of conflict has arisen as to the applicability of the pre-trial dis-
covery provisions when they are invoked to reach materials gathered or
prepared by an adverse attorney for litigation. The first definitive state-
ment of the governing principles in this area was set forth in the Supreme
Court decision in Hickman v. Taylor.' The Court, while strictly limiting
the attorney-client privilege to attorney client relations,2 created a quasi-
privilege for information from non-client sources if obtained by an at-
torney in preparation for litigation.3 This work product exemption pro-
tects the material prepared by the attorney from discovery except upon a
showing of special circumstances justifying such an invasion. This deci-
sion laid the groundwork for a myriad of other discovery problems. Al-
though establishing the exemption, it did not delimit the purview of work
product, nor did it determine what factors would constitute the good
cause necessary to compel production of such material. The situation
was very aptly described by Chief Justice Jones in Viront v. Wheeling &
Lake Erie R.R., when he said:
The Rules of Civil Procedure designed to simplify practice and
procedure in the Federal District Courts have been the subject
of more interpretative legal literature than almost any branch
of law . . . and more particularly did the case of Hickman v.
Taylor account for a large part of it-a veritable Pandora's
Box!'
The Federal Rules afford three separate procedures which poten-
tially constitute a basis for the invocation of the principles of Hickman.
Rule 26 would seem to furnish the method most likely to invade work
product since it may be directed to the attorney immediately and such
materials would normally be within his control.' The majority of the
1. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
2. Id. at 508.
3. Id. at 510.
4. 10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, "Any party may take the testimony of any person . . . by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. .-. . The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided by Rule 45." Fed. R.
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cases, however, have arisen under Rules 33 and 34.' Although these
rules may properly be directed only to parties, this does not mean that the
information or material sought will necessarily lie outside the work pro-
duct exemption. Emphasis has been placed on the control factor to ful-
fill the requirement of "possession, custody or control" demanded by
Rule 34, material in the hands of the attorney being considered within
the control of the party and subject to production provided all other con-
ditions are met.7
WORK PRODUCT
As previously noted, two primary elements can be gleaned from the
principles laid down in Hickman. First, that the matter must have been
prepared in preparation for trial. What this preparation for or anticipa-
tion of litigation entails is not entirely clear. It has been held that the
probability of litigation is sufficient,' while other decisions indicate that
actual preparation for trial is essential.9 Under the latter standard, prepa-
ration not only for trial but for trial in the instant case may be de-
manded."0 Secondly, the data must reflect the influence of the attorney's
legal abilities. Conversely, work product characterization has been de-
nied where the work was not that peculiar to an attorney and not de-
manding his skill and training" or where only factual accounts of the
Civ. P. 45(b): "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to
produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein . . ."
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33: "Any party may serve upon any adverse party written in-
terrogatories to be answered by the party served. . . ."; Fed. R. Civ. P. 34: "Upon
motion of any party showing good cause therefor . . . the court . . . may order any
party to produce . . . designated documents, . . . in his possession, custody, or control."
7. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The Court said, "Where relevant and
nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those
facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had." 329
U.S. at 511. Atlantic Greyhound Co. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Bif-
ferato v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 11 F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The fact
that the material is in the possession of the attorney is not sufficient to preclude dis-
covery under Rule 34. But see: Kelleher v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). Material in the attorney's possession is not subject to production under Admiralty
Rule 32 (F.R.C.P. 34) (Seems partially based on lack of showing of necessity).
8. Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 386 (D. Colo.
1955) ; But see, Zenith Radio Corp. v. R.C.A., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954). (Remote
possibility of litigation not sufficient).
9. Gulf Construction Co. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv.2d 34.411, Case
4 (S.D. Tex. 1959). Coffey v. Pennsylvania R.R., 25 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 7
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
10. Tobacco & Allied Stocks v. Transamerica Corp., 16 F.R.D. 534 (D. Del.
1954). Correspondence in connection with a prior case where the attorney did not rep-
resent the party is not work product in the instant case. Mills Music Inc. v. Cromwell
Music Inc., 14 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Preparation after the claim has arisen is
protected but not the attorney's product in relation to prior events.
11. Bifferato v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 11 F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7 F.R.D. 732 (D.D.C. 1948) ; Lauritzen v. Atlantic Grey-
hound Corp., 8 F.R.D. 237 (E.D. Tenn. 1948).
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sources of information were sought.12 The weight to be accorded these
decisions, however, may be diminished in light of the expansion of the
work product exemption in Alltinont v. United States." While Hickman
would seem to indicate that these two standards should be concomitant
elements of equal importance, a survey of the area will indicate instances
where apparently one factor or the other has been primarily emphasized
to arrive at the desired result.
As might have been anticipated the primary source of controversy
in the work product area has involved the statements of witnesses ob-
tained by attorneys. 4 Materials obtained personally by counsel would
seem at least privia fade to carry the stamp of his influence. As will be
evidenced, however, this prima facie classification may be rebutted solely
on the basis of the type and substance of the material involved.
It may be stated as a general rule that the written statements of wit-
nesses taken by an attorney in preparation for trial are within the area of
protection afforded work product." Since witnesses' statements would
normally be obtained in preparation for litigation, the main area of con-
tention here apparently concerns the reflection of the attorney's profes-
sional influence." Unsigned statements of witnesses prepared by an at-
torney' and statements taken by an attorney in personal interviews also
almost unanimously fall within the same general rule." Thus, protection
would generally be accorded whether the statements are oral or written,
signed or unsigned. 9
12. Lundberg v. Welles, 11 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
13. 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
14. The Hickman decision was limited factually to the statements of witnesses
taken by an attorney.
15. Buining v. S.S. Transporter, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 34.411, Case 3 (D. Md.
1959) ; Tandy & Allen Construction Co. v. Peerless Casualty Co., 20 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957) ; Banana Distributors Inc. v. United Fruit Co., 22 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411,
Case 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Sturm v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 16 F.R.D. 476 (D. Conn.
1954).
16. McComb v. Aibel, 100 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1951); Stone v. Grayson Shops,
Inc., 8 F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
17. Hanke v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transport Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wisc.
1947).
18. E.g., Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 176 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Gaynor
v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 11 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 6 (E.D. Pa. 1948)
(Also apparently decided on the oral statement protection of Hickman).
19. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) : The Court said, "Petitioner has made
more than an ordinary request for relevant, non-privileged facts in the possession of his
adversaries or their counsel. He has sought discovery as a matter of right, of oral and
written statements of witnesses whose identity is well known and whose availability to
petitioner appears unimpaired. . . ." 329 U.S. at 508. "Here is simply an attempt, without
purported necessity or justification, to secure written statements, private memoranda and
personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of
his legal duties. As such it falls outside the area of discovery and contravenes the pub-
lic policy underlying the orderly presentation and defense of legal claims. Not even the
NOTES
It may be important, however, to determine just what constitutes an
oral statement. If a witness merely dictates a statement which is re-
corded verbatim, it would reflect the opinion and impressions of the
witness rather than those of counsel. If it is not a verbatim recording or
is the product of questioning by the attorney, it would fall within the
area specially protected in the Hickman decision.2" It seems that only in
the rare instance where the statement is solely the product of the witness
without any influence of counsel is the theory laid down in Scourtes
valid.21
Other cases have used slightly different language, indicating that
texts and resum6s of witnesses' statements are not subject to production,
but that the burden is upon the one objecting to show that the material
constitutes such texts or resum6s. 22  It is not clear from the language of
the cases whether "texts or resumes" refers to the witnesses' written
statements or to summaries of the oral statements of a witness prepared
by an interviewer. If the latter interpretation is correct, it falls within
the strict prohibition of Hickwman. 2' The limitation to summaries of oral
statements would add little to the work product concept as far as deline-
ating its scope. If, however, the reference is to simple witnesses' state-
ments solely the product of the witness, the holdings furnish authority
for a slightly broader purview of work product.
The case perhaps second only to Hickman in importance and impact
in the work product controversy is Alltmont v. United States.24  The Dis-
trict Court held that the work product privilege was not applicable to
copies of statements obtained by persons other than trial counsel. This
holding, while in accord with the prevailing trend whereby statements
most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and
mental impressions of an attorney." 329 U.S. at 510. Contra; see Scourtes v. Allbrecht
Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953). "The 'work product' of an attorney con-
sists only of impressions, observations and opinions which he has recorded and trans-
ferred to his file. The written statement of a witness, whether prepared by him and
later delivered to the attorney, or drafted by the attorney and adopted by the witness is
not properly considered the work product of an attorney."
20. Scourtes v. Allbrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Molloy v.
Trawler Flying Cloud Inc., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 6 (D. Mass. 1950). An
account originally held to be a mere verbatim recordation on rehearing was held to be
work product in that it was at least partially the work product of the attorney's question-
ing.
21. Scourtes v. Allbrecht Grocery Co., supra note 20.
22. McNeice v. Oil Carriers Joint Venture, 22 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Hazell
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 15 F.R.D. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
23. Shank v. Associated Transport Inc., 10 F.R.D. 472 (M.D. Pa. 1950) ; Jones v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 662 (N.D. Ill. 1947).
24. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950). Actually the
case arose under Admiralty Rule 31, which is identical to F.R.C.P. 33.
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taken by the defendant party,25 by a legal department, 2 and by the
F.B.I., 2 were held not to constitute work product, was reversed on appeal
with the court stating that the Hickman rationale applied to all statements
of a prospective witness which had been obtained for the use of trial
counsel. Whether the Alltmont holding was based on the attorney's in-
fluence or his preparation for trial, the case would seem to indicate that
a significant step was taken expanding the work product exemption to
statements of witnesses, regardless of the status of the persons obtaining
them. Thus, the Hickman protection has been extended to include agents
other than an attorney who obtained statements for counsel's use,28 or
who obtained the statements at the instance or under the direction of
counsel.2" The other cases since Alltmont also seem generally to uphold
its rationale, at least where statements of witnesses are sought.
30
Since this decision, expanding the scope of Hickman, the courts in
determining whether investigators' reports are work product have relied
more heavily upon the question whether the investigation was made in
anticipation of or in preparation for litigation,3" leading to an inference
that Alltmont was based on the attorney's influence. Even if it is found,
however, that the material was obtained in preparation for litigation, a
25. DeBruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
26. Hayman v. Pullman Co., 8 F.R.D. 238 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
27. O'Neil v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
28. Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112 (D.N.J. 1956); Fay v. Stauffer Chem.
Co., 19 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Neb. 1956). The case also holds that the work product im-
munity continues despite the non-professional custody of the file from time to time.
Floe v. Plowden, 10 F.R.D. 504 (E.D.S.C. 1950), (Investigator hired by insurer to
furnish information to defendant's counsel). See also, Overly v. Hall-Neal Furnace
Co., 12 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Roach v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 19 F.R.D. 267
(D. Mass. 1956) which infers that such materials would be work product though pro-
duction was granted on a showing of good cause sufficient for work product; McNelley
v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955). Where the investigation was made by the
agent of a non-party and apparently not for the counsel of either party, production was
denied. However the holding was not based on the immunity of Hickman but rather on
the ground that one party should not have the benefit of another's work.
29. Bifferato v. States Marine Corp. of Delaware, 11 F.R.D. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Herbst v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 10 F.R.D. 14 (S.D. Ia. 1950); Berger v.
Central Vermont Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1948). Contra, Colorado Mining & Ele-
vator Co. v. American Cyanamide Co., 11 F.R.D. 306 (W.D. Mo. 1951). The holding,
however, was qualified to the extent that if the statements contained any material worked
out by counsel, public policy would forbid their use.
30. United States e.x rel. T.V.A. v. Bennett, 14 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1953);
Reed v. Swift & Co., 11 F.R.D. 273 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Shank v. Associated Transport
Inc., 10 F.R.D. 472 (M.D. Pa. 1950).
31. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
Where the material was turned over to trial counsel within one month, it was held to be
in preparation for litigation, though the holding was partially based on the fact that legal
skill had been used in preparing the report. Royal Exchange Assurance v. McGrath,
13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Material is not work product when obtained well
prior to suit. McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Not in anticipa-
tion of litigation when obtained prior to time cause of action arose.
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work product determination may involve further limitations.32 It seems
clear that if the Alitmoint doctrine is followed, investigators' reports
should fall within the protected area. Alltmont also removed the area of
doubt existing in regard to the opinions and test results of experts. Prior
to the decision, the reports of experts engaged by counsel were deemed
not to fall within the exemption afforded the lawyer's work product."
Since that time, however, the reports of experts engaged by counsel and
obtained under the direction and supervision of counsel,34 or prepared for
their use," are, as a general rule, held to be imbued with the same status
as the attorney's work product.3" There are a few cases to the contrary,
especially where the reports contain only factual material, or are of a
scientific nature completely unconnected with legal practice,8 but these
cases again rely on the remoteness of the possibility that this type of re-
port would reflect the attorney's influence.
There seems to be no question that materials produced independently
by the attorney are part of the work product. Varying types of materials
32. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
Information must presently be part of the work files of the attorney before it is entitled
to work product protection. But compare, Connecticut Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16
F.R.D. 5 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) which holds that the work product limitation is not based
upon the same considerations as the attorney-client privilege, and it is not waived by the
fact that it is out of the attorney's possession and revealed to others. Accord, e.g., Boh-
lin v. Brass Rail, 20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Fay v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 19
F.R.D. 526 (D. Neb. 1956). Thus it appears that the Kelsey-Hayes case is wrong if it
is based on waiver of the work product exemption because of any non-possession by the
attorney. If, however, it says that material must be being used for trial preparation, it
is probably justified. Keystone Coat & Apron Mfg. Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 21
F.R.D. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1957), indicates that the material must contain opinions and ob-
servations before it is entitled to protection. But compare, Scourtes v. Allbrecht Gro-
cery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953). Here the court held that even if the data is
gathered under the supervision of an attorney and in preparation for trial, it will not be
protected if it contains merely the opinion and impressions of the witness rather than
counsel.
33. Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948). The serv-
ices of an expert retained in connection with a patent case were held not to fall within
the attorney-client privilege protecting work product. (A number of cases, as here,
loosely denominate the exemption, failing to properly distinguish the attorney-client privi-
lege and work product protection); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
34. Mark v. Gas Service Co., 168 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo. 1958); Scourtes v.
Allbrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
35. Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D..
Neb. 1959); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); Smith v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 7 F.R.D. 735 (D.D.C. 1948).
36. Lundberg v. Welles, 11 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Virginia Metal Prod. v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
37. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (D. Colo. 1953).
38. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv.
2d 34.411, Case 3 (D. Del. 1959) ; Leding v. United States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 221
(D. Mont. 1959), (Movant had already made the result of his analysis available);
Hickey v. United States, 17 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.351, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
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have been included under this apparent rationale. Diagrams and sketches
are held to be work product in that they constitute a portion of the im-
pression of counsel,39 and such material prepared by others if it meets
the qualifications of Alltmont would seem to be entitled to protection.
Questionnaires formulated by an attorney constitute work product,4 but
there is some conflict as to whether the answers to such questionnaires
are also protected.4 Where the movant already has a copy of the ques-
tionnaire, the policy behind refusal to grant production seems to be pro-
tection of the attorney's trial preparation rather than his impressions or
theories. Attorney's memoranda fall within the work product exemp-
tion provided they are actually prepared in preparation for trial.42 Simi-
larly correspondence between co-counsel falls within the scope of Hick-
man. 4
3
As noted previously, not all materials, even though obtained by an
attorney are included in work product. Perhaps the largest area of ex-
clusion in this area has arisen in connection with statements taken by
members of a claims department. The expansion of work product as
enunciated in Alitmont has not been deemed to include statements ob-
tained by a claims agent or department even if the agent is in fact an
attorney.44 These decisions are primarily based upon a judicially created
exception to the Hickman exemption nominated "in the regular course of
business."45 Under this exception, statements or other materials are held
not to be work product if they are obtained in accordance with the stand-
ard operating procedure of any enterprise. This exception applies even
39. Humphries v. Pennsylvania R.R., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Scourtes
v. Allbrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
40. United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949).
41. United States v. Swift & Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 34.411, Case 2 (N.D. Ill.
1959). The court denied work product protection on the ground that the answers did
not constitute any of the attorney's impressions where the questionnaire was already in
the hands of the movant. Contra, United States v. Deere, supra, note 40. Discovery
denied though movant had copy.
42. Slifka Fabrics v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). Vilastor-Kent Theater Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), (Mem-
orandum of legal department at instance of general counsel); Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Though the attorney was not autono-
mous he was held to have acted in a basic professional relationship and turned the data
over to trial counsel. Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). (Memorandum prepared by attorney for defendant-work product). Compare,
Zenith Radio Corp. v. R.C.A., 121 F. Supp. 792 (D. Del. 1954). A patent department
memorandum is normally not work product unless prepared for "house consel" or "out-
side counsel" for specific litigation.
43. Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 13 F.R.D. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
44. Chaney v. Smith, 23 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 3 (D.D.C. 1956) ; Panella
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Hughes v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 7 F.R.D. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
45. E.g., Viront v. Wheeling and Lake Erie R.R., 10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1950);
Portman v. American Home Products Corp., 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
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to the legal department if it can be shown that the material sought was
obtained in the regular course of business.46 Of course if the informa-
tion is obtained in preparation for trial and not in the normal course of
business, the Hicknan; doctrine will be applied." The determination in
the type of case in which the legal department is ostensibly involved and
the product is outside the regular course of business exception may turn
upon the question whether in fact the attorneys are employees or are
autonomous.4" As to statements taken by government investigator-
attorneys, however, there is some conflict with the test of work product
seeming to be whether or not the government has a duty to prosecute or
defend a particular claim. 9 The sole basis of this exception, since the
AlItmont decision, seems to rest on the factor of preparation for actual
litigation.
A homogeneous situation exists in regard to three types of data
sought to be discovered which also are generally held not to be work
product-names of witness, interrogation as to what material the op-
ponent has, and requests for facts. There is, however, some conflicting
authority in each area. The work product policy would seem to afford
little basis for objection to the production of witnesses' names, and gen-
erally they may be obtained."0 Some courts distinguish between a simple
request for names and a more extensive one and may deny an attempt to
46. Brown v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Browner v. Fireman's Insurance Co. of Newark, 9 F.R.D. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
47. Scourtes v. Allbrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953). There is
no difference whether the attorney is corporate or autonomous as long as he is engaged
in actual trial preparation. Breen v. American Pacific S.S. Co., 17 Fed. Rules Serv.
34.411, Case 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Statements obtained in the regular course of business
were granted; those not so obtained denied. Portman v. American Home Products
Corp., 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). (Statement taken by general counsel after
claim protected). Berger v. Central Vermont Ry., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1949),
(Statement not in regular course but at instance of general counsel work product).
48. Cogdill v. T.V.A., 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947). The case distinguishes
intrinsic privilege and work product, especially where it is not clear whether the relation-
ship is that of attorney-client or employer-employee. Production was ordered, but on
rehearing, after a showing that the attorney was autonomous, the material was held to
be work product and production was denied.
49. Snyder v. United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956). An Aircraft Accident
Board investigation was held to be work product in that the results were obtained for
the Attorney General who had a duty to defend and who maintained no force of in-
vestigators for each governmental subdivision. Contra, Durkin v. Pet Milk Co., 14
F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1953). Instructions given by a Dept. of Labor attorney to an
investigator were held not sufficient to make the statements taken by him work product.
If the Alltmont rationale were followed, this would seem to be work product.
50. B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1
(S.D. Tex. 1959) ; Bree v. Mutual Benefit Health & Ace. Ass'n., 25 Fed. Rules Serv.
33.321, Case 7 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Siegel v. Yates, 11 F.R.D. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Contra, Walczak v. Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor Freight Inc., 140 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ind.
1956).
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secure the more extensive information."' The majority approach re-
specting inquiries as to what material the opponent has is that these are
unobjectionable, 2 but at least one court has protected this type of infor-
mation. 3 Generally neither may a party be precluded from the discovery
of material facts."4 Such inquiry, however, is limited to facts, and, for
example, an interrogatory may not pry into an attorney's theory." It
seems also that facts communicated by an attorney to his client are work
product."
Perhaps the conflict of authority in the area of names of witnesses,
interrogation as to what materials the opponent has, and requests for
facts may be explained by the courts' concept of the purpose and policy
of the Hickman rule. If approached from the aspect of protecting the
mental impressions and processes of the attorney, there would be little
objection to allowing discovery since they could rarely be reflected in
such data. If on the other hand the protection of the attorney's prepara-
tion is the predominant factor in the court's thinking, this type of ma-
terial could well fall within the work product exemption though offering
little indication of counsel's thought processes.
In contrast to the independent production of the attorney, some
data, even if an attorney is instrumental in its procurement, is not sus-
ceptible of his influence. On this basis photographs"7 and public or semi-
51. O'Brien v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of United States, 13 F.R.D. 475 (W.D.
Mo. 1953). Movant sought the names of persons known to the plaintiff to have knowl-
edge, names of those from whom facts obtained, names of witnesses giving statements,
names of those who took statements; all denied. Hickey v. United States, 17 Fed. Rules
Serv. 33.351, Case 1 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Movant sought names of appraisers and their
results; denied in toto. Cunningham v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 11 F.R.D. 331 (E.D.N.Y.
1951).
52. Bree v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n., 25 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.321, Case
7 (E.D. Pa. 1958); McCall v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 16 F.R.D. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
53. O'Brien v. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of United States, 13 F.R.D. 475 (W.D.
Mo. 1953).
54. B. & S. Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 24 F.R.D. 1
(S.D. Tex. 1959) ; McNeice v. Oil Carriers Joint Venture, 25 Fed. Rules Serv. 33.31,
Case 2 (E.D. Pa. 1958) ; O'Donnell v. Breuninger, 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 3
(D.D.C. 1949).
55. Cleminshaw v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 21 F.R.D. 30 (D. Del. 1957); Rediker v.
Worfield, 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
56. Klop v. United Fruit Co., 18 F.R.D. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Magida v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Facts learned through attorney remain
work product though attorney-client privilege waived. See, O'Donnell v. Breuninger,
13 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 3 (D.D.C. 1949). (Work product but produced on
good cause). Contra, Marrow v. Atlantic Refining Co., 10 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211,
Case 6 (E.D. Pa. 1947). Production was ordered whether obtained through counsel or
underwriters where same counsel represented both.
57. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Great Northern Ry., 18 F.R.D. 357 (D. Colo. 1955) ; Flynn v. J. C. Nichols
Co., 11 F.R.D. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
NOTES
public records"5 are excluded from work product. Private records also
are generally not protected" but may constitute work product if they con-
tain matter relating to preparation for trial."0 Correspondence between
co-defendants has also understandably been denied the safeguard of
Hickman.0 '
In at least two areas the courts have generally failed to make any
definitive determination of work product. The majority of cases, where
the statement of the movant or of a party 2 is sought, make no determina-
tion as to whether such a statement constitutes work product. Generally,
the question is not reached, the case being decided on the basis of good
cause alone."3 Sometimes the refusal to find work product is grounded
on the regular course of business exception" or on the fact that the state-
ment was taken by a claims agent or other non-attorney. " These latter
cases are not inconsistent with a restrictive interpretation of Alltmont,
since the language and facts there were limited to witnesses' statements.
Similarly no particularized determination of work product is made where
the demand is so sweeping that there is no question but that to grant it
would amount to a clear invasion of the attorney's privacy and would be
directly contrary to Hickman."0
PRODUCTION AND GOOD CAUSE UNDER RULES 26 AND 33
Preliminary to the survey of what constitutes good cause for the
production of work product, some notice should be taken of the good
58. United States v. Great Northern Ry., 18 F.R.D. 357 (D. Colo. 1955), Records
of United States Forestry Service) ; Flynn v. J. C. Nichols Co., 11 F.R.D. 275 (W.D.
Mo. 1951) ; (Routine official city records) ; Dellaneo v. Great Lakes Steamship Co., 9
F.R.D. 30 (N.D. Ohio 1949), (Hospital records).
59. Virginia Metal Products v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950).
60. Dorn v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., 155 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Calif. 1957).
61. Ibid.
62. Chatman v. American Export Lines Inc., 20 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Irvine v. Safeway Trails Inc., 10 F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
63. E.g., Traylor v. Central R.R., 21 F.R.D. 112 (S.D.N.J. 1957); Miehle v. United
States, 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
64. Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1948) ; Brown v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 15 F.R.D. 503 (D.N.H. 1955); Viront v. Wheeling & Lake
Erie R.R., 10 F.R.D. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
65. New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957); Szymanski v.
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 14 F.R.D. 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Hudalla v. Chicago, M.
St. P. & P.R.R., 10 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950). Though the regular course of busi-
ness exception was not specifically mentioned, a statement taken by a defendant's in-
surer's attorney was technically held not to be work product, the case being decided on
good cause, with the inference, however, that under some circumstances it might be
protected. Safeway Stores Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
66. Brush v. Harkins, 9 F.R.D. 681 (W.D. Mo. 1950); accord, Goldberg v. Trav-
eler Fire Ins. Co., 11 F.R.D. 566 (W.D.N.Y. 1951); Maryland ex. rel Peters v. Balti-
more & O.R.R., 7 F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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cause requirement divorced from any work product consideration. As
the Rules of Civil Procedure now stand, there is no patent requirement
of any good cause for the production of documents under Rule 26 in con-
junction with Rule 45 (b). Production would apparently be available as
a matter of right, and this is the position that has been taken by some
courts. 7 The doctrine enunciated in Hickman would seemingly require
good cause only when discovery of work product is in question. There
is a growing tendency, however, for the District Courts to hold that the
same showing of good cause for the production of documents is neces-
sary under Rule 26 as is required under Rule 34.8 The rationale of this
position essentially follows that elucidated in North v. Lehigh Valley
Transit Co. 9 There the Court reasoned that since the Federal Rules con-
stituted an integrated body of regulatory provisions, they were to be con-
sidered in pari nateria. Under this rule of construction it was deter-
mined that the procedure of 26-45 (b) was simply a short cut to the pro-
duction of documents and that it was not intended that, although requir-
ing good cause under Rule 34, production might be had as a matter of
right under Rules 26 and 45 (b). From the standpoint of the wider per-
missible reaches of Rule 26, it seems plausible that at least as great a
showing should be required as under Rule 34. Since Rule 26 may be
directed against a non-party, there would appear to be less justification
for invading his privacy without requiring any reason than that of a
party who has some real interest in the controversy.
Since Rules 26 and 34 provide for the production of documents, the
primary question in connection with Rule 33 is whether any documentary
production may be had at all. Secondarily, if production is allowed, need
good cause be shown as a prerequisite? The majority of courts, where
documentary production is sought from a party, hold that it must be ob-
tained through the procedures of Rule 34."° Nevertheless, a few courts
have allowed the production of documents under Rule 33. This is true,
however, only in the technical sense, since they have considered the mo-
tions as-though they had been made under Rule 34, granting production
upon a showing of good cause as a matter of expediency and to prevent
67. E.g., Shepard v. Castle, 20 F.R.D. 184 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
68. Mitchell v. Strauss, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 34.13. Case 5 (D.R.I. 1959);
Schwartz v. Broadcast Music Corp., 16 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See also, Roach v.
Boston Tow Boat Co., 19 F.R.D. 267 (D. Mass. 1956); McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D.
360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
69. North v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 26b.211, Case 5 (E.D.
Pa. 1950).
70. E.g., Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 967 (1950) ; Stone v. Marine Transport Lines, 1 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 33.316, Case
2 (D. Md. 1959); Cannaday v. Cities Service Oil Co., 19 F.R.D. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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undue delay." It is difficult to say that one position is more proper than
the other. Admittedly the Rules should be followed, and there should
be no objection to requiring strict conformance. This is true from a
technical or mechanical point of view which would require that the at-
torney follow the proper procedure. When the problem is considered on
a policy basis and the interests of the party are taken into account, how-
ever, the circumstances may militate more strongly for the more liberal
view. But such liberality should not be extended to such a degree that
the requirement of good cause would be obviated. A few cases seem to
have gone to this extreme, requiring production of documents without
any extrinsic showing of good cause or prejudice."2 These cases ra-
tionalize this liberality on the ground that the question is not one of pro-
duction of documents, but of divulging facts, production being the best
method of obtaining the facts.
This liberality to the extent of obviating good cause is much more
difficult to justify. Where a separate procedure has been established for
the production of documents upon a showing of good cause, it is difficult
to see how production as a matter of right can be condoned. These two
rules are essentially different. Interrogatories seek the facts as the party
sees them and have the effect of admissions. Rule 34 seeks primary
source material, without any limitation, explanation or interpretation. 3 It
is one thing to allow production where a party has misconceived the
proper rule for his purpose but factually fulfills all the requirements. It
is quite another to choose the proper rule and then seek to emasculate the
more stringent requirements of an equally available rule.
GOOD CAUSE FOR WORK PRODUCT
The tests contained in Hickmn relative to what will constitute good
cause for the production of work product are just as nebulous as those
for determining work product itself. The statements for all practical
purposes are limited to the broad extreme instances which will justify
discovery. 4 It would seem to be a reasonable conclusion that the good
cause required by Rule 34 or the good cause for the production of work
product when demanded under any of the three rules will necessitate the
same factual showing regardless of the rule under which it is invoked.
71. Fredricksen v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 17 F.R.D. 307 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); Irvine v.
Safeway Trails Inc., 10 F.R.D. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1950) ; Hayman v. Pullman Co., 8 F.R.D.
238 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
72. O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948). The case was
qualified to the extent that if any privileged matter or opinion were contained in the
statement, it should be edited by the judge.
73. Chatman v. American Export Lines, 20 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
74. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
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The line of demarcation between good cause and the good cause for
work product is only vaguely defined. But theoretically, it seems clear
that at least something above and beyond the good cause of Rule 34 is
required. The work product good cause has been variously defined as
"very good cause, ' 75 "a stringent standard of good cause,"" "unusual
circumstances,''" "rare situations," 8 and other kindred statements."9
The good cause for Rule 34 is normally less stringent than that for
work product, requiring a showing of such factors as time differential,"0
exclusive knowledge, inequality of investigative opportunity, or the fact
that the witness is hostile or relatively inaccessible.8 Similarly, practical
convenience, facilitation of proof or progress at trial, 2 and the fact that
the objecting party controlled the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion have been held sufficient.8" The bare allegation, however, that such
conditions exist is not sufficient.8 4 These instances serve to illustrate the
differences between the good cause of Rule 34 and that required for work
product. It seems clear that work product demands necessity or some-
thing bordering thereon,85 while expediency or the prevention of undue
advantage are perhaps the underlying requirements of Rule 34." The
separation of good cause, however, may not always involve such a clear-
cut dichotomy. Several cases would differentiate the degrees of good
cause required for work product.8 7
75. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Corp., 2 Fed. Rules
Serv. 2d 34.411, Case 3 (D. Del. 1959).
76. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
77. Mark v. Gas Service Co., 168 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo. 1958).
78. Scourtes v. Allbrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
79. Caldwell-Clements Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 12 F.R.D. 531 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952); Knab v. Pennsylvania R.R., 12 F.R.D. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Dulansky v.
Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 8 (S.D. Ia. 1950). See
also, Helverson v. J. J. Newberry & Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
80. E.g. Tannenbaum v. Walker, 16 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
81. Scourtes v. Allbrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
82. Royal Exchange Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Contra,
Hilton v. Contiship Corp., 16 F.D.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (Mere convenience is not
good cause).
83. Brown v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 17 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
84. Grogan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 11 F.R.D. 342 (W.D.N.Y. 1951).
85. Helverson v. J.J. Newberry & Co., 16 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
86. Generally, also, the courts hold that where the parties positions are equal or
the movant's is superior, there is not possibility of showing the requisite necessity, as a
rule making no determination of work product. E.g., O'Brien v. Equitable Life Ins.
Co. of United States, 13 F.R.D. 475 (W.D. Mo. 1953) ; United States ex rel. T.V.A. v.
Bennett, 14 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1953); Cunningham v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 11
F.R.D. 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
87. United States v. Swift & Co., 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 34.411, Case 2 (N.D. Ill.
1959). Where the factors supporting the claim of good cause are weak, the requisite
showing of good cause is lessened accordingly. See also, Sturm v. Great A. & P. Tea
Co., 16 F.R.D. 476 (D. Conn. 1954). A strong showing of good cause is necessary for
oral statements, but a slight showing may suffice for written statements.
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There have been relatively few cases where sufficient good cause for
the production of work product has been shown. It would seem that the
courts in general fail to reach the work product question in cases where
good cause is also in issue by denying production for failure to show the
good cause required by Rule 34, or by granting production without fur-
ther comment as to whether the good cause shown is that of Rule 34 or
Hickman.8" Such an approach adds little to the appreciation of what cir-
cumstances will warrant discovery of an attorney's work product. In the
majority of cases where the work product question has actually been de-
cided, production has been granted only after a determination that no
work product was involved, thus requiring only the normal showing de-
manded by Rule 34.8
Generally the cases have allowed production of work product only
where the standard of Hickman has been met, i.e., the identity of wit-
nesses is unknown and the information sought is unavailable from any
other source.9" Thus where the information may be compelled by other
means or from other sources, or where no effort has been made, produc-
tion will not be ordered.9'
Thus any definite generalization other than in the extreme cases is difficult to
make. A survey, however, of the particular circumstances which have been held to
afford sufficient reason for the production of work product in various instances may
furnish some broad, guiding principles.
88. E.g., Caldwell-Clements v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 12 F.R.D. 531 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952); Knab v. Pennsylvania R.R., 12 F.R.D. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
89. E.g., Flynn v. J.C. Nichols Co., 11 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
90. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen, 182 F.2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Scourtes
v. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953) ; Burns v. Philadelphia Trans-
portation Co., 113 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Other situations, however, have been
held sufficient to meet the requirement. Mark v. Gas Service Co., 168 F. Supp. 487
(W.D. Mo. 1958). A report of an investigation of the cause of a fire was allowed
where the investigators could not remember the facts and they could not be pieced to-
gether by other means. Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954).
Dismantling of a boiler was held to constitute unavailability of evidence analogous to
unavailability of witnesses. Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D.
Ohio 1952), (Similarly held where auto disassambled) ; Brookshire v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
14 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ohio 1953). The refusal of employees to give any information
when the facts are within the exclusive knowledge of one party is equivalent to un-
availability of witnesses.
91. Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 176 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1949); Walczak
v. Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor Freight Inc., 140 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ind. 1956); Overly
v. Hall-Neal Furnace Co., 12 F.R.D. 112 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Maryland ex rel Peters
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 7 F.R.D. 666 (E.D. Pa. 1947); Hanke v. Milwaukee Elec.
Ry. & Transport Co., 7 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wisc. 1947). There is some conflict as
to whether no other source should be interpreted to mean no other source of dis-
covery or no other source apart from the discovery rules. Lindsay V. Prince, 8 F.R.D.
233 (N.D. Ohio 1948). Other discovery methods (deposition) were available, but
discovery was allowed under Rule 34. Contra, Thompson v. Hoitsma, 19 F.R.D. 112
(D.N.J. 1956), (Party lacks good cause when another method of discovery avail-
able); McManus v. Harkness, 11 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Good cause is not
met when there is no showing that other discovery methods are not available.
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Production is not warranted on the suspicion or possibility that the
statements contain impeaching material, 2 but if it is shown that actual
impeaching material is present; this seems to be sufficient good cause."3
Neither is good cause shown on the mere allegation or conclusion that
production is necessary for trial preparation?4 Nor does relevancy have
any bearing on good cause as such; good cause deals with the reasons for
compelling the production of relevant material."
Only in a few cases have the courts allowed discovery upon a show-
ing that fell short of the requirement of necessity. The fact that state-
ments were taken immediately after the occurrence in conjunction with
the lapse of time, and the fact that statements would not be of equal value
even if the witnesses were supplied have been held to be good cause."
This position may be reconciled with the general rule, however, if infor-
mation obtained almost contemporaneously with an event is deemed
unique. Then it would possibly fall within the category of data un-
obtainable from any other source. This is as far as the courts have lib-
eralized the requirement, and the cases seem to stand alone in extending
or expanding the permissible circumstances sufficient to justify the pro-
duction of work product.
92. Raudenbush v. Reading Co., 9 F.R.D. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
93. Hanger v. Chicago, R.I.&P.R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954); But com-
pare, United States v. Great Northern Ry., 18 F.R.D. 357 (D. Colo. 1955). Circum-
stances may warrant a reasonable probability that impeaching material is present. Where
plaintiff's employees refused to allow the movant to continue copying from a document,
production was allowed, but only as to the document in question.
94. E.g., Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811 (D.D.C. 1948). There is
no good cause where there are no supporting affidavits showing any of the con-
siderations of Hickman or any other considerations evidencing need. (A blatant
example is Silvetti v. United States, 8 F.R.D. 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). An affidavit to
the effect that the movant would like to explore his adversary's files was under-
standably held to scarcely meet the requirement).
95. Reeves v. Pennsylvania R.R., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949).
96. Roach v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 19 F.R.D. 267 (D. Mass 1956). Witnesses
were available, but they had forgotten many of the details of the incident. The
adverse party taken statements immediately after the accident. Herbst v. Chicago,
R.I.&P.R.R., 10 F.R.D. 14 (S.D. Ia. 1950). The court held the material not
work product but said such factors would constitute good cause if it were. Mark
v. Gas Service Co., 168 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Mo. 1958) would seem to be in accord,
enumerating similar factors, i.e., complexity of the subject, immediacy of tests, lapse
of time, but the holding seems rather based on the unavailability of vital facts from
any other source. Dusha V. Pennsylvania R.R., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 10
(N.D. Ohio 1950) would seem to go further, but it seems to be completely a product
of the court's discretion and is based on the fact that the statements "may be useful
and serve in the interests of justice in the examination of witnesses." The Court
held that while the showing of good cause was not all that could be desired, it would
be deemed sufficient. Contra, Cogdill v. T.V.A., 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947).
(Such factors not sufficient where the names of witnesses have been furnished.)
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PROTECTION AGAINST INVASION OF WORK PRODUCT
A party seeking protection against what he considers an improper
attempt to reach work product may seek a protective order under Rule
30(b). 7 Under this rule the trial judge is given the discretion to make a
judgment as to whether discovery should be allowed."3 Since an inter-
locutory order is not appealable under the final order doctrine, 30(b)
seems to be the only general recourse without following the "gallant
Fortenbaugh" into contempt by a refusal to obey the order."
A quasi-review is, however, obtainable in that the party may peti-
tion the trial court for a rehearing of an adverse order.'
Fortenbaugh has gathered few followers in his crusade. With al-
most complete unanimity, the parties accept the ruling of the trial court
or petition for a rehearing rather than go into contempt. Only two cases
were discovered in which the contempt procedure was invoked by the
movant and in neither case was it enforced.' 10
It is very unlikely that any relief will be had by assigning a dis-
covery order as grounds for a new trial. The courts typically reject such
grounds, holding that it is difficult to see what purpose would be served
by a new trial after production of the document and a trial on the
merits. °2
CONCLUSION
Generally the doctrine laid down in Hickman has proved to be a
workable rule. There seem to be only minor deviations from a consistent
series of holdings among the various districts and under the individual
discovery rules. Work product determination has been made primarily
dependent upon the factors set up by Hickman. The only really defini-
tive holding possibly extending the scope of protection was that in
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
98. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947).
99. But see, Cleary Bros. v. Christie Scow Corp., 176 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1949).
The court ordered a dismissal unless interrogatories were answered in fourteen days.
At the expiration of this period it was held to be a final order since there was no
possibility of compliance. Alltmont also states that an interlocutory order in Admiralty
is appealable.
100. E.g., Dorn v. Balfour, Guthrie & Co., 155 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Calif. 1957);
Molloy v. Trawler Flying Cloud Corp., 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 34.411, Case 6 (D.
Mass. 1950).
101. Hauger v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954). An
order adjudging the defendant guilty of contempt was entered, but, like Fortenbaugh
he was found not guilty on the basis of a finding of work product. Virginia Metal
Products v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 10 F.R.D. 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The court
refused to punish a party for contempt since he was acting under the advice of
his counsel.
102. E.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1957).
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Alltmont which expanded work product to include material obtained for
the use of counsel in preparation for trial.
There may be, nevertheless, a deviation from the policies of Hick-
man and Alltmont in the "regular course of business" exception. As ap-
plied to the strict course of normal business it is unobjectionable. When,
however, the exception is applied to the normal course of business fol-
lowing an unusual occurrence, it is more difficult to justify, at least
where the procedures carried on are those undertaken by an attorney.
There seems to be little realistic distinction between preparation for spe-
cific litigation after suit and preparation for practically inevitable litiga-
tion before suit if the object of the work product rule is to protect the
attorney's mental impressions and processes. Understandably, less criti-
cism could be leveled at the exception if the material were obtained by
one not an attorney, but under the Alltmont doctrine this, too, should be
protected where gathered at the instance of counsel or under the super-
vision of counsel. Perhaps the courts have sought to counteract the ex-
pansive force of Alltmont by accenting preparation for actual litigation
rather than the more liberal anticipation of litigation.
The end result attained, however, need not be censured. The result
reached by the courts is probably desirable in those cases where production
has been granted. The methods by which these results have been reached
are what may be considered inconsistent. There is an apparent direct cor-
relation between the existence of such circumstances as lapse of time and
inequality of investigative opportunity or facilities and the application of
the exception. While these factors constitute good cause under Rule 34,
they are not generally held sufficient for work product. Perhaps the
courts should extend good cause for the production of work product as
has been done in a few cases to include such circumstances rather than
to exclude such material generally from the Hickman rule. This would
allow the courts to tailor production to the individual factual situation
rather than to apply the exception generally. This the courts have failed
to do. Good cause for work product except in a few, isolated instances
has remained even more stable under the various rules than work product
coverage. The holdings almost unanimously hew to the line of virtual
necessity or unavailability of Hickman, allowing production in relatively
few instances.
Perhaps the most appropriate summation of the current general
tenor in the work product-good cause area would be a paraphrase of Jus-
tice Cardozo's famous statement. The assault on the citadel of work
product is not continuing apace!
